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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL COURTS AND PROCEDURE - CONCURRENT AND
CONFLICTING JURISDICTION - THE ABSTENTION
DOCTRINE
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
Under the federal abstention doctrine, a litigant who is properly
before a federal district court seeking relief on the ground that a
State statute violates his federally protected constitutional rights may
be denied a federal forum and shunted off to the State courts for a
decision on the issues in question. Before the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Zwickler v. Koota' it was unclear when a
federal court might abstain from deciding a case, involving federal
and State questions of law,2 to allow the State courts a reasonable
opportunity to pass judgment upon the case.3 It was apparent, how-
ever, that if the federal questions were not litigated on the State
court level the plaintiff could go back to the federal forum for a
determination of these issues if the federal court had only stayed its
proceedings and not dismissed the case.4
Sanford Zwickler was convicted under a New York law pro-
hibiting dissemination of anonymous political leaflets.' (Similar
statutes are presently in effect in 36 other States.)' Zwickler had
1389 U.S. 241 (1967).
2 Once a federal court's jurisdiction has been properly invoked, the court has the
power to decide the case before it even on purely State questions of law. Siler v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). For a discussion of Siler, see Lewis, The High
Court: Final ... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES L. REV. 528, 598-99 (1968).
3 See cases cited in note 51 infra. It should be emphasized that the Zwickler de-
cision applies only to cases in the area of free expression and first amendment rights.
The Court has refused to clarify the role of the abstention doctrine in other areas of con-
stitutional rights. See Fenster v. Leary, 386 U.S. 10 (1967) (mem.). In this decision
the Court affirmed a federal district court's application of the abstention doctrine where
a State vagrancy statute was challenged as violating the eighth, 13th, and 14th amend-
ments. For a discussion of the effect of this per curiam decision, see Lewis, supra note
2, at 633. See also note 54 infra.
4England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (dis-
cussed in note 57 infra). Concerning dismissal, see note 10 infra.
5 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 781-b (McKinney 1954), as amended, N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 457
(McKinney Supp. 1967). This statute makes it a crime
to distribute in quantity, among other things, any handbill for [anyone] which
contains any statement concerning any candidate in connection with any elec-
tion of public officers, without also printing thereon the name and post office
address of the printer thereof and of the person at whose instance such hand-
bill is so distributed. 389 U.S. at 242 (emphasis added).
GALA. CODE tit. 17, § 282 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1412 (1947); CAL.
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violated the statute by passing out anonymous handbills that were
critical of the record of a United States Congressman seeking reelec-
tion. His conviction was reversed on State law grounds by a New
York Supreme Court, because the prosecution failed to show that
Zwickler had distributed leaflets "in quantity" as required by the
statute.' The New York Court of Appeals affirmed this reversal
without opinion.8 Fearing future arrests for distribution "in quan-
tity," Zwickler invoked the jurisdiction of a three-judge federal dis-
trict court9 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the
ground that due to "overbreadth" the New York statute was re-
pugnant to the constitutional guarantees of free expression. The
three-judge court, with one judge dissenting, applied the doctrine
of abstention and dismissed"0 the case because Zwickler had not
ELEC CODE ANN. § 12,047 (West Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-21-50
(1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.37 (Supp. 1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-104
(1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. §
738.22 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1714 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 123.095,
123.130 (Supp. 1967); LA. REV. STAT. § 18:1531 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, 5 1575 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 221 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
56, 55 39, 41 (1952); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1914 (1956); MINN. STAT. § 211.08
(Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. 5 1341 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.300 (1966);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 5 94-1475 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1131 (Supp.
1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 70.14 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.34-
38.1-4 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-17.1 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE §
3599.09 (Page Supp. 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. § 260.360 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, 5 3546 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-23-2 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE §
16.9930 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2238 (1955); TEX. ELEC. CODE art.
14.10 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-24 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 2022
(Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. 5 24-456 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 29.85.270
(1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-12 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.16 (1967).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 612 (1964).
7 People v. Zwickler, 16 N.Y.2d 1069, 213 N.E.2d 467, 266 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1965).
81,d.
) Jurisdiction was obtained under the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1964), which gives original jurisdiction to federal district courts for civil actions to
redress the deprivation, under State laws, of rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Federal Constitution, and under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1964).
10 It should be noted that on appeal, the United States Supreme Court in Zwickler
stated:
It is better practice, in a case raising a federal constitutional or statutory claim,
to retain jurisdiction, rather than to dismiss, see Note, Federal-Question Ab-
stention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
604 (1967), but other courts have also ordered dismissal. Compare Gov-
ernment & Civic Employees Organizing Committee, CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364 [(1957)]; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 [(1950)], with Stainback
v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 [(1949)]; Local 333B, United Marine
Div., Int'l Longshoremen's Assn. v. Battle, 101 F. Supp. 650 (D.C.E.D.Va.),
aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 880 [(1951)]. See generally Note, Judicial Ab-
stention From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 Col. L. Rev. 749, 772-
774 (1959). Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244-45 n.4 (1967).
Dismissal is the rule, however, in cases where abstention is ordered to avoid interference
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exhausted the State declaratory judgment remedy." The majority
of the three judges noted that Zwickler could assert his constitution-
al challenge in defense of any criminal prosecution for future viola-
tions of the statute.' The court held that it was within its equitable
discretion to abstain and that federal-State friction would be avoided
by letting a State court have the first opportunity to resolve ques-
tions of State law even though questions concerning the Federal
Constitution were involved.3 The court reasoned that a dispositive
State court decision might eliminate the necessity of deciding the
federal constitutional question.'4
The Supreme Court reversed the three-judge federal district
court and, in an important clarification and reaffirmation of the
first amendment exception to the federal-question abstention doc-
trine, 5 held that a federal district court has no discretion to abstain
from deciding the merits of a declaratory request when the State
statute is claimed to violate the first amendment right of free ex-
pression. 6
The abstention doctrine, applied by the district court in Zwick-
ler, was first enunciated in a 1941 opinion by Justice Frankfurter in
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.' In the Pullman case, the
Court upheld a federal district court's refusal to issue an injunction
with a comprehensive State regulatory system. E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
For a discussion of Burford-type abstention cases, see Note, Judicial Abstention from
the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COL. L. REV. 749, 757-62 (1959). The Court
has also affirmed lower courts' decisions to abstain and dismiss where the administra-
tion of State criminal laws were in question. E.g., Fenster v. Leary, 386 U.S. 10
(1967) (mem.); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
11 In New York the action for declaratory judgment (N.Y. CIV. PRAC. 5 3001 (Mc-
Kinney 1954) ) has been recognized as the remedy available to a defendant seeking to
test the constitutionality of a State criminal statute under which prosecution is threatened.
See De Veau v. Braisted, 5 App. Div. 2d 603, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1958), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d
236, 157 N.B.2d 165, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959), affld, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). This
position may have been affirmed in Fenster v. Leary, 386 U.S. 10 (1967) (mem.),
afftg 264 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the Court upheld a three-judge federal
court's abstention which was based on the fact that the petitioner had not exhausted his
State declaratory judgment remedy. For a similar holding in Ohio, see Peltz v. City of
South Euclid, 11 Ohio St. 2d 128, 228 NE.2d 320 (1967).
12 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
13 For a discussion of these policy arguments, see notes 17-19, 37-47 infra & accom-
panying text.
14 See text accompanying note 18 infra.
15 This exception and its reaffirmation in Zwickler is discussed in text accompanying
notes 42-52 infra.
16 389 U.S. at 254.
17 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In Pullman Negro porters alleged that a State railroad
commission denied them their jobs on racial grounds by requiring conductors to be put
in charge of all sleeping cars.
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against the Texas Railroad Commission until the State courts had
an opportunity to void the commission's action on State law grounds.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that it was within the equitable dis-
cretion of the federal court to abstain and that "[the resources of
equity are equal to an adjustment that will avoid the waste of a
tentative [federal] decision as well as the [federal-State] friction of
a premature constitutional adjudication."'" The Court stressed that
it was "important considerations of policy in the administration of
federal equity jurisdiction [that are) decisive here"1 and that the
alleged racial discrimination "touches a sensitive area of social policy
upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alterna-
tive to its adjudication is open."2
The Pullman abstention doctrine can be viewed as a latent re-
action to the problems engendered by the famous case of Ex parte
Young."' In Ex parte Young the power of a federal court to enjoin
a prosecution by a State official under a State statute found uncon-
stitutional on its face was upheld.22 The Court characterized the
federal injunction power and its proper exercise in broad terms, stat-
ing that an injunction was justified where State officials threatened
and were about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or crimi-
nal nature, against individuals for acts which were protected by the
Federal Constitution.23 Considerations of federalism have tem-
pered the exercise of federal injunctive relief," and the Court has
181d. at 500 (emphasis added).
191d. at 501 (emphasis added). Professor Charles Wright has listed four such
policy considerations: Abstention may (1) avoid the necessity of deciding a federal con-
stitutional question if the case may be disposed of on questions of State law, (2) avoid
needless conflict with State administration, (3) let States resolve unsettled questions of
State law, and (4) ease the burden of the federal court docket. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 52, at 169 (1963). The fourth policy consideration has been rejected. See
Lankenau v. Coggeshall & Hicks, 350 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1965); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 322 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1963).
20 312 U.S. at 498. Although still sensitive, racial discrimination cases are the least
likely candidates for abstention today. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668 (1963). For a discussion of the civil rights cases and the abstention doctrine, see
Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era,
80 HARV. L. REv. 604, 607-11 (1967).
21 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Note, supra note 20, at 605 n.12.
22 209 U.S. at 155-56.
23 1d. at 156.
24 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). This statute and its predecessors do not pre-
clude the issuance of injunctions against the institution of State court proceedings, but
only bar stays of suits already instituted. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2
(1965). See Note, Federal Power To Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARV. L. REV.
726, 728-29 (1961); Note, The Dombrowski Remedy - Federal Injunctions Against
State Court Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERs L. REv. 92,
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stated that "federal interference with a State's good-faith adminis-
tration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal
framework."25  Accordingly, the rule has been established that fed-
eral injunctive relief will be granted only in exceptional cases "to
prevent irreparable injury which is dear and imminent."26  In
Zwicklcr v. Koota, the district court did not find the "special cir-
cumstances" necessary to justify the exercise of the federal injunc-
tive power." Furthermore, in abstaining, the three-judge court re-
fused to consider the merits of the declaratory judgment which was
also sought.
The development of a "special circumstances" test has created
an exception to the federal abstention doctrine. The first "special
circumstance" was established in 1943 in the case of Douglas v. City
of Jeannette,0  where the Court said that abstention would not be
applied if there were dear and imminent danger of irreparable in-
jury.3
95-97 (1966). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); Cameron v. Johnson, 88 S. Ct. 1335
(1968).
25 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), cited in Zwickler v. Koota,
261 F. Supp. 985, 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
26 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943). In this case the Court
upheld a federal district court's refusal to enjoin the application of a city ordinance to
religous solicitation, even though the ordinance was that very day held unconstitutional
by the Court in reviewing a criminal conviction under it. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943). The Court later explained its actions by stating: "Since injunctive
relief looks to the future, and it was not alleged that Pennsylvania courts and prosecutors
would fail to respect the Murdock ruling, the Court found nothing to justify an injunc-
tion." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The presumption that
State courts will apply federal constitutional law in cases pending before them has been
firmly established in the area of removal of cases from a State court to a federal court.
Rachel v. Georgia, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), aff'g 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965); Peacock
v. City of Greenwood, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), rev'g 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965); Cox
v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965).
27 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
28 1d. at 992.
29 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (discussed in note 26 supra).
30 Id. at 163-64. The Court has discussed considerations which are not within the
"special circumstances" test in certain diversity cases. In Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228 (1943), a diversity action in which equitable relief was sought in a fed-
eral district court, the Supreme Court held that mere difficulty of State law did not justify
abstention in favor of a State court action. In this case Chief Justice Stone announced
broadly that
the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine
the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal
court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly
brought to it for decision. Id. at 234, cited in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959).
"The Court has frequently applied the Meredith principle, and refused to order absten-
tion though a case involved difficult questions of state law." C. WRIGHT, supra note 19,
§ 52, at 175. See cases cited id. n.39. But in Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316
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The abstention doctrine reached its broadest definition in a quar-
tet of decisions on June 8, 1959.31 These cases reiterated the policy
that the State courts should have the first opportunity to adjudicate
the constitutionality of State enactments."2 More important how-
ever, these cases also established the groundwork for a second "spe-
cial circumstance": that the State court remedies must be inade-
quate, or conversely, the litigant must have exhausted his State court
remedies."3 In one of these cases, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux,4 a diversity case involving condemnation pro-
U.S. 168 (1942), and Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 200, 229 (1957),
the Supreme Court required the federal courts "to stay their proceedings pending the
submission of state law questions to state determination." Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1959) (discussed in text accompanying notes
34-40 infra). See also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (discussed
in text accompanying note 61 infra). See generally Note, Abstention and Certification
in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850
(1964), cited in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 n.11 (1967).
31 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Harri-
son v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360
U.S. 185 (1959); Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
32 In the service of this [abstention] doctrine, which this Court has applied in
many different contexts, no principle has found more consistent or clear ex-
pression than that the federal courts should not adjudicate the constitution-
ality of state enactments fairly open to interpretation until the state courts
have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to pass upon them. Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959), cited in Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp.
985, 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S, 241 (1967) and Fenster v. Leary,
264 F. Supp. 153, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd mem., 386 U.S. 10 (1967).
The Court in Zwickler quoted the following analysis from United States v. Living-
ston, 179 F. Supp. 9, 12-13 (E.D.S.C. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 281 (1960), as a "guide
to decision":
The decision in Harrison, however, is not a broad encyclical commanding
automatic remission to the state courts of all federal constitutional questions
arising in the application of state statutes.... Though never interpreted by
a state court, if a state statute is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will
avoid or modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of a federal
court to decide the federal question when presented to it. 389 U.S. at 250-51.
3 The requirement of exhausting State remedies provided a rationale for the fed-
eral district courts' abstention in Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 993 (E.D.N.Y.
1966), revd, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), and in Fenster v. Leary, 264 F. Supp. 153, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mem., 386 U.S. 10 (1967). But see Turner v. City of Mem-
phis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (abstention vacated which had been ordered only because
State declaratory judgment remedy had not been exhausted). The first exception to
the Ex parte Young federal injunction doctrine (discussed in text accompanying notes
21-25 supra) was that a litigant must have first exhausted his State remedies. Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908). The rationale for this exception was
that it would avoid federal-State friction. Id. at 230. This same rationale was applied
in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 17-20 supra). Similarly, in certain cases, litigants attempting to
remove from a State court to a federal court were not allowed to show that the State
court remedies were inadequate. See removal cases cited in note 26 supra; Note, The
Dombrowski Remedy, supra note 24, at 118-20.
34360 U.S. 25 (1959).
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ceedings under a State eminent domain statute, the Court gave the
appearance of removing the equity limitation on abstention.35 In
Thibodaux, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, said that
prior abstention cases "did not apply a technical rule of equity pro-
cedure... [but] reflect[ed] a deeper policy derived from our fed-
eralism." 6 In this case the State law was unclear, and although an
eminent domain proceeding had been deemed a "suit at common
law, 57 the Court upheld abstention to avoid federal-State friction.8
Nevertheless, the Court in Thibodaux emphasized the "special na-
ture of eminent domain," analogized condemnation cases to equit-
able proceedings, and stressed the State's inherent interest in the sub-
ject matter of eminent domain."
Thibodaux was the high watermark for the abstention doctrine,
and in Zwickler v. Koota4° the judicial tide has receded to the point
where the federal courts' equitable discretion to abstain is entirely
removed in the area of free expression and first amendment rights.
After Justice Frankfurter's retirement in 1962 the abstention
doctrine became an orphan of the Court.4 In 1964 and 1965 two
cases were decided by the Court which provided an exception to the
traditional Pullman abstention doctrine. Baggett v. Bullitt' and
3 This limitation was established by Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500-01 (1941), see text accompanying note 18 supra;
36 360 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
37 360 U.S. at 28, citing Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1875).
3 8 
'The justification for this [abstention] power... lies in regard for the respec-
tive competence of the state and federal court systems and for the maintenance of har-
monious federal-state relations .... " 360 U.S. at 29.
391d. at 28-29; see C. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 52, at 174. On the same day that
Thibodaux was handed down, the Court also decided County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), which was also a diversity case involving condem-
nation proceedings. The Court in Allegheny refused to allow abstention because the
State statute had been dearly construed and there was little "hazard of friction in fed-
eral-state relations." Id. at 187, 192.
40 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
4 1 See Note, supra note 20, at 604. In the nine cases concerning the propriety of
abstention which have reached the Court since 1962, in all but one abstention has been
held improper. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Feaster v. Leary, 386 U.S.
10 (1967) (federal court's abstention affirmed in a memorandum decision; discussed in
note 3 supra); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964); Hostetter v. Idelwild Boan Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964);
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668 (1963). The Court also refused to permit abstention in Turner v. City of
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam). In six of these cases - all except Fen-
ster, Harman, Davis, and Hostetter - the Court overruled lower court decisions to ab-
stain. These cases made it apparent that civil rights and void for vagueness were two
types of cases where abstention was improper.
42377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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Dombrowski v. Pfister43 were cases involving rights of free expres-
sion. Both cases involved overly broad or void for vagueness State
statutes. In Baggett v. Bullitt, where a loyalty oath was required as
a condition of employment at a State university, the Court held that
there were no "special circumstances" present that would justify
abstention by the three-judge federal court.44 The Court noted that
abstention might "require piecemeal adjudication in many courts
... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an un-
due length of time .... " and that these should be important con-
siderations in determining whether or not to abstain.45
In Dombrowski v. Pfister,46 a civil rights case brought to enjoin
enforcement of a subversive activities control law, the Court held
abstention improper because the statute was attacked as an uncon-
stitutionally vague regulation of expression. 7 Justice Brennan rea-
soned that abstention would subject Dombrowski to the "uncertain-
ties and vagaries" of a criminal trial in a situation where "the fact
of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or fail-
ure" inevitably had a "chilling effect upon the exercise of First
Amendment rights" and that in such a situation abstention would
serve "no legitimate purpose."" The Court further declared that
"where . . . prosecutions are actually threatened, this challenge, if
not clearly frivolous, will establish the threat of irreparable injury
required by traditional doctrines of equity."49
Together, Baggett v. Bullitt and Dombrowski v. Pfister estab-
43 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
44 "Ascertainment of whether there exist the 'special circumstances' prerequisite
to [the abstention doctrine's] application must be made on a case-by-case basis ...
Those special circumstances are not present here." 377 U.S. at 375. See also Whitehill
v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967) (loyalty oath invalid for vagueness, federal district court's
dismissal of case reversed); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 380 U.S. 157 (1943) (dis-
cussed in note 26 supra).
45 377 U.S. at 378-79, citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm., CIO v.
Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101 (1944).
46 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
47 Id. at 497.
4 8 Id. at 487, 491-92 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 490 (emphasis added). Dombrowski, therefore, demanded a reconsidera-
tion of the policy of avoiding federal-State friction, under which federal courts had de-
clined to interfere with State judicial proceedings. To a large extent the validity of
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (discussed in note 26 supra), the
leading case on federal-State comity, was removed by Dombrowski. See Brewer, Dom-
browski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights Cases




lished a first amendment exception to the federal-question absen-
tion doctrine. The exception made undue delay, irreparable injury,
and limitations on free expression three explicit factors to be con-
sidered before abstention is ordered. This exception was thought
to have wide implications." However, as seen in Zwickler, the "spe-
cial circumstances" tests were too indefinite and vague for effectu-
ating the requisite judicial certitude, at least in the area of first
amendment rights."
In Zwickler the Court extended and clarified the first amend-
ment exception to the abstention doctrine by holding that a federal
court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of
a declaratory request if a State statute is constitutionally attacked
as void for overbreadth.52 In such a case a federal court does not
have the discretion to abstain,"u since to do so would delay consider-
ation of the statute's constitutionality. In Zwickler the Court de-
clared that in a case involving first amendment rights "to force the
plaintiff who has commenced a federal action to suffer the delay of
state court proceedings might itself effect the impermissible chilling
of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect.
''14
50 'The void-for-vagueness doctrine can be used in many different ways, and depend-
ing upon the purposes for which it is employed, widely varying implications can be
seen in Dombrowski." Note, supra note 20, at 612. See A. BIcKEL, THE LEASr DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH 149-52 (1962); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
51 "A continued policy of creating vague judge-made exceptions to a judge-made rule
can only compound the confusion." Note, supra note 20, at 611. Compare Fenster
v. Leary, 264 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd uzem., 386 U.S. 10 (1967), with
Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 241 (1967)
and Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
52 The Court stated that a statute is void for overbreadth when it "offends the con-
stitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities con-
stitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep un-
necessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms,'" specifically first
amendment freedoms. 389 U.S. at 250, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964). Compare with Fenster v. Leary, 386 U.S. 10 (1967) (mem.). In Zwickler
the Court distinguished void for overbreadth from void for vagueness, stating that the
latter entails "a statute 'which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application."' 389 U.S. at 249, citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stated that the pro-
priety of abstention should not depend upon whether the complaint has alleged over-
breadth, or only vagueness, because "[1] neither principle has ever been definitively
delimited by this court .... [2] there is no reason to suppose that a case involving
allegations of overbreadth would inevitably be inappropriate for abstention .... [3]
such a standard might in effect reduce the abstention doctrine to a pleader's option ...."
Id. at 257. For the different constitutional considerations involved in attacks for "vague-
ness" and for "overbreadth," see Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04,
608-10 (1967), cited it) 389 U.S. at 250 n.13.
5S 389 U.S. at 254.
5 Id. at 252 (emphasis added). In Fenster v. Leary, the Court may have held for
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Prejudicial delay, caused when the federal and State courts send
the parties shuttling back and forth in an attempt to get someone to
reach a binding decision,55 and the resulting increase in cost of liti-
gation are the most serious drawbacks to abstention proceedings.
While in theory true abstention does not deny access to the federal
courts, it merely postpones access;rc nevertheless, the postponing of
a federal remedy until after a dispositive State decision has been
reached seems antithetical to a right that may be prejudiced by de-
lay. A third problem of abstention is that the State court may reach
a dispositive decision on the merits without deciding the constitu-
tional question, thus leaving the litigant open to future prosecutions
under the same untested statute. A fourth criticism of the doctrine
is that the litigant may be precluded, because of res judicata, from
later appealing the federal constitutional questions to a federal dis-
trict court.5" Finally, there may be other special and peculiar cir-
cumstances attendant when the "abstained" litigant arrives in the
State courts.58
the first time that the chilling-effect-of-delay argument is not available to a plaintiff un-
less a "delay in adjudication on the merits could be 'costly where the vagueness of a state
statute may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.'" Fenster v. Leary, 264
F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis added), aft'd mem., 386 U.S. 10
(1967), quoting from Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 379 (1964); see Lewis, The
High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 528, 633 (1968).
55 E.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (final de-
cision on the merits delayed 7 years); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Ex-
aminers, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (9 years); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
220 (1957) (8 years after abstention ordered, issue declared moot in United States v.
Leiter Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965)); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thi-
bodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (7 years). See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF
THE DMvsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, proposed
28 U.S.C. § 1371 (d) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966); W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FED-
ERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 64, at 241-42 n.52.5 (C. Wright ed. Supp. 1967);
Liebenthal, A Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its Effect on the Abstention Doc-
trine, and Some Suggested Solutions, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 157, 158-65 (1966).
56 See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959).
5 7 In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964),
the Court established the rule that where the requirements for abstention are met the
parties must be sent to the State courts. The Court further stated, however, that "the
litigant is in no event to be denied his right to return to the District Court unless it
dearly appears that he voluntarily ... fully litigated his federal claims in the state courts."
Id. at 421 (emphasis added). It was also stated that the plaintiff
may inform the state courts that he is exposing his federal claims there only
for the purpose of complying.., and that he intends, should the state courts
hold against him on the question of state law, to return to the District Court
for disposition of his federal contentions. Such an explidt reservation is not
indispensable .... When the reservation has been made, however, his right
to return will in all events be preserved. Id. at 421-22.
See Government & Civic Organizing Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
5 8 For example, while the right to a jury trial is guaranteed in the federal courts, this
right might not be guaranteed by a State constitution for a State declaratory judgment
THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
A possible solution to the problems inherent in abstention is in-
terjurisdictional certification. Under this technique, State law ques-
tions arising in federal courts are certified directly to the highest
State court for decision. 9 This procedure minimizes the delay on
the appellate level present in regular abstention and should avoid
the waste of a tentative federal decision as well as the friction of a
premature constitutional adjudication." Certification does not for-
feit the parties' rights to the advantages of a federal forum, and it
affords the highest State court an opportunity to clarify the State
law aspects in question. This procedure has been used in Floridae1
and other States, but not with complete success. 2 The obvious dif-
ficulty with certification is that it is tantamount to asking for an
advisory opinion - the State court not being allowed to base its
decision upon a real case or controversy.63
action. See Renee v. Sanders, 160 Ohio St. 279, 116 N.E.2d 420 (1953). There may
also be State constitutional provisions which circumvent uniformity and lend credence
to the argument that the litigant should not be forced into the State courts when a federal
question is involved. E.g., OIo CONsT. art. IV, § 2 provides that: "No law shall be
held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of at least
all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of appeals
declaring a law unconstitutional and void .. " This provision fosters the paradox
whereby a law may be constitutional and valid in certain districts, and unconstitutional
and void in others. This provision has also been criticised for permitting judicial con-
trol over important constitutional questions by a minority Ohio Supreme Court vote and
for allowing the court of appeals to become the final arbitrator of constitutional ques-
tions. See Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 354, 191 NE. 366 (1934). See
generally Meier, The Power of the Ohio Supreme Court To Declare Laws Unconstitu-
tional, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 293 (1931). Although not recently, the Supreme Court of
the United States has held that this provision is not violative of the due process or equal
protection clauses of the Federal Constitution. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist.,
281 U.S. 74 (1930).
59 See Liebenthal, supra note 55, at 201-09; Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification:
Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344
(1963). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 52, at 176; Wright, The Federal Courts
and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 325-26 (1967);
Note, supra note 30, at 866-72.6 o See text accompanying note 18 supra.
61See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960); FLA, STAT. § 25.031
(1961).
6 2 See 7A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACIcE § 1254(3), at 361 (2d ed. 1966), dis-
cussing 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1964).
63 Some State court rules provide for advisory opinions, e.g., Massachusetts and
Maine. However, the reasons why federal courts should not issue advisory opinions, as
stated by the Supreme Court in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41
(1937), seem equally applicable to State courts. Compare id., with United Pub. Work-
ers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). The Court in England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964) (discussed in note 57 supra),
stated: "It has been suggested that state courts may 'take no more pleasure than do fed-
eral courts in deciding cases piecemeal . . .' and 'probably prefer to determine their ques-
tions of law with complete records of cases in which they can enter final judgment be-
fore them.'" Id. at 421 n.12, citing Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 227
(1960) (dissenting opinion).
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Two other alternative solutions to the problems of abstention
are that the Supreme Court abolish the doctrine entirely, " or, in
Justice Harlan's words, "definitively delimit" the tests for applying
the abstention doctrine.65  The Court has refused to do the latter,"
but Zwickler can be viewed as virtually abolishing the federal-ques-
tion abstention doctrine in cases involving freedom of expression.
An inherent fault of the Court-made abstention rule is that the rule
itself sweeps too broadly in other areas of constitutional rights and
may in effect deny personal liberties of more importance than the
policy reasons for applying the doctrine.67 In light of Zwickler,
therefore, the sagacious lawyer who does not want to risk being sent
from the federal forum to the State courts, will seek to protect his
client's claim by challenging the State statute on grounds of "over-
breadth" and by relating the claim to the preferred68 first amend-
ment freedoms."
JAMES L. HILDEBRAND
64 See Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights: To a More Perfect Union,
40 TEX. L. REV. 211, 224, 229 (1961).
65 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 257 (1967) (concurring opinion). See also
note 52 supra.
66 Fenster v. Leary, 386 U.S. 10 (1967) (mem.); see notes 3, 54 supra.
67 See notes 51, 54-58 supra & accompanying text.
68 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Hetherington, State Economic Reg-
ulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 13 & 226 (1958).
69 Compare Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967), where Ken-
tucky's vagrancy statute was successfully attacked on first amendment grounds, with Fen-
ster v. Leary, 264 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd mem., 386 U.S. 10 (1967). In
the latter case a similar New York vagrancy statute was unsuccessfully attacked on eighth,
13th, and 14th amendment grounds. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions
in Baker v. Bindner showed an awareness of the Supreme Court's per curiam affirmance
of Penster v. Leary.
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